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Abstract
Is discounting of future instantaneous utilities consistent with altruism towards
future selves? More precisely, can temporal preferences, expressed as a sum of dis-
counted instantaneous utilities, be derived from a representation in the form of
a sum of discounted total utilities? We ﬁnd that a representation in the quasi-
exponential (β,δ)-form in Phelps and Pollak(1968) and Laibson (1997) corresponds
to quasi-exponential altruism towards one’s future selves: the current self gives quasi-
exponentially declining weights to her total utilities in future periods. For β =1 /2,
these welfare weights are exponential, while for β<1/2 they are biased in favor of
the current self, and for β>1/2 in favor of the future selves. More generally, we
establish a functional equation which relates welfare weights to instantaneous-utility
weights and apply this equation to a number of examples. We also postulate ﬁve
desiderata for instantaneous-utility discounting. None of the usual discount func-
tions satisfy all desiderata, but we propose a simple class of discount functions which
does.
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11 Introduction
Samuelson (1937) introduced discounting of instantaneous utilities as a modelling approach
in economics: “During any speciﬁed period of time, the individual behaves so as to max-
imize the sum of all future utilities, they being reduced to comparable magnitudes by
suitable time discounting.” (op. cit. p. 156). In order to obtain analytical tractability, he
apologetically added the assumption that the discounting be exponential: “For simplicity
we assume ... that the rate of discount of future utilities is a constant.... The arbitrariness
of these assumptions is again stressed ...” (op. cit. p. 156).
Time preferences have recently come back into the foreground in the economics liter-
ature, this time focusing on quasi-exponential or “hyperbolic” discounting, see Laibson
(1997), Barro (1999), Krusell and Smith (1999) and Laibson and Harris (2001). Such pref-
erences easily give rise to dynamic inconsistency.1 This implication from non-exponential
discounting was noted already by Ramsey (1928) and analyzed by Strotz (1956), Pollak
(1968), Phelps and Pollak (1968), and Peleg and Yaari (1973).
In all these studies, preferences are represented by utility functions in the form of
a sum of discounted instantaneous utilities. We here pose the question whether such
preferences are consistent with the assumption of forward-looking agents who care about
their future total utility, not only about their future instantaneous utilities. In other
words: is discounting of future instantaneous utilities consistent with altruism towards
future selves?2
Consider a decision-maker who is to choose a sequence x =( x0,x 1,x 2,...) of consump-
tion vectors xt t obec o n s u m e da td a t e s t =0 ,1,2,.... In Phelps and Pollak (1968) and
Laibson (1997), the consumer’s preferences at any decision time τ are represented by a






where β>0 and 0 <δ<1. The term u(xt) is interpreted as the instantaneous utility
in period t. We will call discount functions in the above (β,δ)-form quasi-exponential
(sometimes these are called quasi-hyperbolic), with exponential discounting as the special
case β =1 .
In the cited studies, the function Uτ is decision theoretic in the usual sense of revealed
preferences: it determines the actual choice made by the consumer in period τ (with









τ−1 preceding period τ. The reason is simple: once a future period τ has become the
present, the rate of substitution between the instantaneous utilities in periods τ +1and τ has changed
from its original value δ to the new value βδ.
2An early discussion of the notion of “future selves”is Elster (1979).
2due regard to the presence or absence of commitment possibilities). From a normative
viewpoint, Uτ (x) represents the welfare of the individual in period τ: the higher this
function value is, the “better oﬀ” is the individual in that period. Current welfare or
“total utility”, so deﬁned, does not stem only from current instantaneous utility but also
from (the anticipation of) the stream of future instantaneous utilities. But, by assumption,
this is true for the welfare in all future periods as well. In particular, the welfare in a
future decision period τ￿ >τwill in part depend on the instantaneous utilities in periods
t>τ ￿. However, formula (1) does not explicitly account for future welfare. For example,
a marginal increase in instantaneous utility two periods ahead from some decision period
τ by an inﬁnitesimal amount ε>0 will add βδ
2εu￿ (xτ+2) to current welfare, but it will
also add βδεu￿(xτ+2) to welfare in the next period - an eﬀect not explicitly accounted for
in equation (1).
We argue that a rational and forward-looking decision maker should respect the pref-
erences of his or her future selves.3 In particular, if also future selves are forward-looking,
then this should not be neglected by the current self. Alternatively phrased: a rational
decision maker who cares about his or her own welfare in future periods should strive to
maximize some increasing function of her welfare in those periods. By contrast, an indi-
vidual who in each period strives to maximize Uτ, as deﬁned in equation (1), appears to
suﬀer from second-order myopia: she cares today about her future instantaneous utilities,
but not about her future total utility (which also includes caring about her future total
utility etc.).4 Does this matter for the induced behavior? Or are preferences of the form
(1) behaviorally equivalent with preferences that care about one’s future welfare?
In order to answer these questions we generalize formula (1) and study utility functions
which can be written as a weighted sum of instantaneous utilities, and show that such
functions have a welfare-theoretic foundation if the discount factor between successive
periods is non-decreasing over time - as it indeed is in quasi-exponential and hyperbolic
discounting. In particular, we ﬁnd that a instantaneous-utility-based representation (1) in
the “classical” exponential form, that is with β =1 , corresponds to one-period altruism:
the individual attaches weight δ to her welfare in the next period and weight zero to all
later periods (but her next self attaches weight δ to the welfare two periods ahead, etc. in
an inﬁnite chain). Such preferences are sometimes assumed in intergenerational (dynastic)
macroeconomic models, see for example Barro (1974) and Barro and Becker (1988).
We also ﬁnd that instantaneous-utility-based representations (1) in the quasi-exponential
form, that is with β<1, correspond to quasi-exponential altruism towards one’s future
selves. The case β =1 /2 plays a special role. For such instantaneous-utility weights,
the welfare weights are in fact exponential; such individuals attach exponentially declin-
3In the same vein, Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) analyze a simultaneous-move game between two altru-
istic players who respect each others’ mutual altruism.
4Ad e c i s i o nm a k e rc o u l db es a i dt ob eﬁrst-order myopic if she does not even care about her future
instantaneous utility from consumption, that is, if βδ =0in eq. (1).
3ing weight to their welfare in all future periods. For β<1/2, the welfare weights are
quasi-exponential with a bias in favor of the current self (“myopia”), while for β>1/2 the
welfare weights are biased in favor of one’s future selves (“farsightedness”).
Another ﬁnding is that exponential welfare weights attached to the next T periods -
and weight zero to all future periods - yield instantaneous-utility weights that are based
on the so-called Fibonacci sequence when T =2 , and for T>2 on generalized Fibonacci
sequences.5 Moreover, we show that these instantaneous-utility weights need not decrease
monotonically over time. Indeed, such an individual may attach more weight to his in-
stantaneous utility two periods ahead than to his instantaneous utility next period. We
also show, by way of examples, that certain instantaneous-utility-based preferences imply
“spite” rather than “altruism” towards one’s future selves, i.e., a preference for as low as
possible welfare in certain future periods. For example, if the parameter β in equation (1)
would apply to periods t =2 ,3,..., rather than to periods t =1 ,2,..., then the associated
welfare weight two periods ahead would be negative.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to identify the recursive functional
equation that constitutes the link between discounting of instantaneous utilities and total
utilities. However, already Zeckhauser and Fels (1968) started from a certain welfare rep-
resentation based on total utilities, and derived the corresponding representation based on
instantaneous utilities.6 Their main result was that “perfect altruism”, that is, exponen-
tial discounting of instantaneous utilities, is incompatible with their chosen representation
based on total utilities.7 As indicated above, however, this claim is not valid in our frame-
work; the welfare representation of exponential discounting of instantaneous utilities is the
above-mentioned one-period altruism (see section 3.1 below).
The present investigation may also have some bearing on a related modelling issue
in macroeconomics, namely whether it matters, in models of sequences of altruistic gen-
erations, if each generation cares only about the next generation’s instantaneous or total
utility, or about all generations’ instantaneous or total utility, see for example Barro (1974),
Andreoni (1989) and Abel and Bernheim (1991).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the model, and
section 3 establishes a one-to-one relationship between welfare weights and instantaneous-
utility weights. Section 4 analyzes a few examples from the literature, and section 5
5The Fibonacci sequence is 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, ...., each term, after the ﬁrst two, being the sum of the
two preceding terms.





7More exactly, they found that this implies b =1 , which makes their welfare representation undeter-
mined, see previous footnote.
4postulates some desiderata for discounting functions. None of the usual formulations satisfy
all desiderata, but in section 6 we propose a simple parametric family of discount functions
which meet the desiderata. Section 7 concludes. Mathematical proofs are collected in an
appendix at the end of the paper.
2 The model
Consider an inﬁnitely lived individual who makes decisions over a sequence of periods
t ∈ N = {0,1,2,...}. In each period t, the individual consumes some vector xt ∈ X, where
X ⊂ Rn is a set of consumption alternatives and n ∈ N+ = {1,2,...}.Aconsumption stream
x is an inﬁnite sequence of consumption vectors xt, and we write x =( x0,x 1,...) ∈ X∞.8
Let ￿τbe the preferences of the decision maker in period τ over consumption streams
x ∈ X∞.A preference proﬁle ￿ for the individual is a sequence (￿τ)τ∈N of preferences,
one for each “self τ”.
We here study preference proﬁles that can be represented by stationary and additively
separable utility functions of the type used in the macroeconomics literature. More exactly,
we focus on preference proﬁles ￿￿τ￿τ∈N for which there exists functions Uτ : X∞ → R, one





for some u : X → R+ and f : N → R+ with the normalization f (0) = 1. Here u(xs) will
be called the instantaneous (sub)utility from consumption in period s, and f(t) the weight
that the decision maker assigns to her instantaneous utility t periods later.
We will say that a sequence ￿Uτ￿τ∈N of such utility functions admits a (stationary and





∗(t)Uτ+t (x) , (3)
for some f∗ : N+ → R.H e r e f∗(t) is the weight that the decision maker places on her
welfare or total utility t periods later.
A negative weight attached to another individual’s welfare expresses “spite” rather
than “altruism.” Such welfare weights appear pathological in the present context.9 We
will hence call a welfare-weight function f∗ regular if it is non-negative. In this case we
will say that ￿Uτ￿τ∈N admits a regular welfare representation.
8Of course, xt need not be consumption.
9We do not deny that the excluded possibility may sometimes be psychologically relevant, but it appears
not to be typical for consumers in conventional decision problems.
53 The welfare representation
Does the sequence ￿Uτ￿τ∈N deﬁned in equation (1) admit a regular welfare representation?
If so, which? A key result for answering this and related questions is the observation that
every sequence ￿Uτ￿τ∈N in the more general form (2) admits a welfare representation of the





f (1) if t =1
f(t) −
￿t−1
s=1 f(t − s)f∗(s) if t>1
. (4)
Proposition 1: If ￿Uτ￿ satisﬁes equation (2) for some u : X → R and f :
N → R, then ￿Uτ￿ admits the welfare representation (3), where f∗ : N+ → R
is the unique solution to (4).
(See Appendix for a proof.)
Conversely, the instantaneous-utility weight function f may be obtained from the
welfare-weight function f∗ via equation (4), which implies
f(t)=
￿
f∗(1) if t =1 ￿t−1
s=0f∗(t − s)f(s) if t>1
, (5)
a recursive equation system which uniquely determines f from f∗ (recall the normalization
f (0) = 1). This equation states that the instantaneous-utility weight f(t) can be computed
as the sum of that period’s instantaneous utility’s contributions to the decision maker’s
welfare in all interim periods.
It is immediate from equation (5) that if f∗ is non-negative, so is f. However, Propo-
sition 1 does not claim that the welfare representation necessarily be regular, even if f
is non-negative. Indeed, the welfare-weight function f∗ may well take negative values
although all instantaneous-utility weights are positive. To see this, note that (4) gives
f∗(2) = f (2) − f2 (1). Hence, in order for the welfare weight f∗(2) to be negative it
suﬃces that f (2) <f 2(1). This is the case, of course, if f (1) > 0 but f (2) = 0.10 The
welfare representation is non-regular, see Figure 1 below.11
Another example is when f is of the hyperbolic form f(t)=1 /(0.5+t); then f2 (1) =
(2.25)
−1 >f(2) = (2.5)
−1. A third example is f(t)=1 /(1+t2), yielding f2(1) = 1/4 >
f(2) = 1/5. A fourth example is when the β in the quasi-exponential representation (1)
kicks in with one period’s delay, that is, when f (1) = δ and f (2) = βδ
2 for some β<1.
10This arises as a special case of the preference structure in the intergenerational analyses in Lane and
Mitra (1981) and Leininger (1986), where each generation’s welfare is as a function of its own consumption
and that of its immediate descendant.
11It is easy to verify that equation (4) gives f∗(t)=( −1)t+1f (1)
t.









Figure 1: Instantaneous-utility weights f(1) = δ and f(t)=0for t>1 (black bars), for
δ =0 .8, and the corresponding welfare weights, f∗(t) (gray bars).
Then clearly f∗(2) = f (2) − f2(1) = (β − 1)δ
2 > 0.12 See Figure 2 below. In all four
cases, the decision-maker is constantly spiteful to his future self two periods ahead.








Figure 2: Instantaneous-utility weights f(1) = δ and f(t)=βδ
t for t>1 (black bars), for
δ =0 .8 and β =0 .6, and the corresponding welfare weights, f∗(t) (gray bars).
A suﬃcient condition for all welfare weights to be non-negative, and hence for the
welfare representation to be regular, is that all instantaneous-utility weights are positive
and that the ratio between successive instantaneous-utility weights - the discount factor
between successive periods - be non-decreasing over time. Equivalently, the discount rate
should be non-increasing. Formally:
Proposition 2: Suppose f : N → R++ and let g : N+ → R be deﬁned by
12This situation would arise if, say, the underlying continuous-time discounting function would be ϕ(t)=
δ
t for t<1 and ϕ(t)=βδ
t for t ≥ 1,w h e r et ∈ R+. If the decision times are t =0 ,1,2,3,...,t h e n( 1 )
applies, while if the decision times are t =0 , 1
2,1, 3
2,..then the discrete-time instantaneous-utility weights,
sequentially labeled, would be f (0) = 1, f (1) = δ
1/2, f (2) = βδ, f (3) = βδ
3/2 etc.
7g (t)=f (t)/f (t − 1).I fg is non-decreasing, then f∗ ≥ 0. If g is strictly
increasing, then f∗ > 0.
The proof of this result, based on our initial and more restrictive conjecture, was kindly
provided by Ulf Persson (see appendix).
The discount function f in the quasi-exponential form (1), for β,δ ∈ [0,1], clearly satisfy
this monotonicity condition; then g (1) = βδ ≤ g(t)=δ for all t>1. Diamond and K˝ oszegi
(Appendix D, 1999) study a “more hyperbolic” version of (1), namely where f (1) = βγδ
and f (t)=βγ2δ
t for all t>1, for some β,γ,δ ∈ [0,1]. Also these discount functions
meet the monotonicity condition; then g (1) = βγδ ≤ g(2) = γδ ≤ g(3) = g (4) = ... = δ.
Hence, each of these representations has a regular welfare foundation.
As a more general comment, we note that with f,f∗ ≥ 0,w eh a v e0 ≤ f∗ (t) ≤ f (t)
for all positive integers, by (4). If, moreover, f (t) → 0 as t →∞ , then so does f∗ (t).
In the following section we analyze examples of instantaneous-utility-based and welfare-
based discount functions.
4E x a m p l e s
4.1 Exponential instantaneous-utility weights
Suppose the instantaneous-utility weights decline exponentially: f (t)=δ
t for all t,f o r
some δ ∈ (0,1). This is the standard case in macroeconomic modelling, corresponding to
the special case β =1in equation (1). It is not diﬃcult to verify that equation (4) then
gives f∗ (1) = δ and f∗(t)=0for all integers t>1.
To see this, ﬁrst note that equation (4) gives f∗ (1) = δ and f∗(2) = 0. Suppose that











Hence, by induction this holds for all positive integers t.
Conversely, suppose that the decision maker cares only about her current instantaneous
utility and her welfare in the next period. Then f∗ (1) = α,f o rs o m eα>0,a n df∗(t)=0
for all integers t>1. An application of equation (5) immediately gives f(t)=αt for all t.






where the discount factor equals the weight that the decision maker attaches to his or her
welfare in the next period.
8In sum: exponential instantaneous-utility weights have a regular welfare foundation.
Zero weight is given to the welfare in all future periods beyond the next.
4.2 Exponential welfare weights
Suppose instead that it is the welfare weights f∗(t) that decrease exponentially over future
periods t. What are then the associated instantaneous-utility weights? More exactly,
suppose that f∗(t)=αt for some α ∈ (0,1) and for all t. Equation (5) then gives f(1) = α,






This conjecture is easily proved to be true by induction, see appendix. Substituting (8) in








for δ =2 α. Hence, exponential altruism is equivalent to the Phelps-Pollak-Laibson repre-
sentation (1) with β =1 /2.
Note that in the special case when α =1 /2,w eh a v eδ =1and thus f(t)=1 /2 for all
integers t. Hence, in this case the same weight is given to the instantaneous utility in all
time periods. This special case is relevant from a biological viewpoint, since the genetic
kinship between any pair of successive generations is precisely 1/2.
4.3 Finite-horizon exponential welfare weights
We next consider the intermediate cases between one-period altruism and exponential
altruism, namely when the welfare weight decreases exponentially over a ﬁnite number of
time periods, beyond which all weights are zero. What is the corresponding reduced form
(2)?
More exactly, let T>1, and suppose f∗(t)=αt for some α ∈ (0,1) and for all





mT(t − s) (10)
for all positive integers t, and mT(0) = 1 (see appendix). It follows from (10) that, for any
ﬁnite horizon T,
1 ≤ mT(t) ≤ mT+1(t) ≤ 2t−1 (11)
9and
α





for all t. Hence, the longer the altruism horizon T, the higher the weight given to each
future instantaneous utility.
Moreover, it follows from an established result for recursive equations that the ratio
between the mT-weights assigned to two consecutive periods t and t+1converges as t goes









= αλT ,( 1 3 )
where λT is the unique solution λ>1 of λ =2− λ
−T. Notice that λT is increasing
in T, and limT→∞ λT =2 . Hence, for each T>1, the instantaneous-utility weights are
asymptotically exponential with discount factor αλT.
In particular the sequence m2 (t) is the Fibonacci sequence. The ratio between succes-










Note also that the induced weight function, f, need not be monotonic. In fact, for all
T ≥ 2 and α>1/2: f(1) <f (2) <f (0). Figure 3 illustrates this feature for T =2and
α =0 .6








Figure 3: Instantaneous-utility weights, f(t) (black bars), and welfare weights, f∗(t) (gray
bars), with two-period-horizon exponential altruism, with α =0 .6.
4.4 Quasi-exponential instantaneous-utility weights
We found that exponential welfare weights imply quasi-exponential instantaneous-utility
weights (β,δ) with β =1 /2. What welfare weights correspond to quasi-exponential
instantaneous-utility weights (β,δ) when β ￿=1 /2?
10Suppose, thus, that f (0) = 1 and f (t)=βδ
t for all positive integers. Then f∗ (1) = βδ
and f∗ (2) = β (1 − β)δ
2. It is not hard to prove by induction that
f∗ (t)=β (1 − β)
t−1δ
t ∀t (15)
(see appendix). Hence, a representation in the Phelps-Pollak-Laibson form (1), with β ￿=1 ,







t Uτ+t (x) ,( 1 6 )
where
β
∗ = β/(1 − β) and δ
∗ =( 1− β)δ. (17)
Quasi-exponential instantaneous-utility weights thus do have a regular welfare founda-
tion, namely quasi-exponential welfare weights. We note that the “welfare myopia” factor
β
∗ is an increasing function of the “instantaneous-utility myopia” factor β, such that β
∗
reaches the value 1 - hence exponential welfare weights - precisely when β reaches 1/2,a n
observation that is consistent with our earlier ﬁnding in the case of exponential welfare
weights. At β =1 /2, welfare weights switch from being biased toward “myopia” to being
biased toward “farsightedness.”
Angeletos et al (2001) made the following estimate of the parameter pair (β,δ) in
the Phelps-Pollak-Laibson model, based on annual US data: β =0 .55 and δ =0 .96. The
associated welfare representation is thus slightly biased toward “farsightedness”: β
∗ =1 .22
and δ
∗ =0 .43. In other words, individuals place relatively more weight on their future
welfare, in comparison with exponential weights: f∗(1) = β
∗δ





4.5 Hyperbolic instantaneous-utility weights
Empirical studies of temporal preferences suggest that the discount function f be hyper-
bolic, rather than exponential. Hence, Ainslie (1992), following Herrnstein (1981) and
Mazur (1987), suggests f(t)=( λ + µt)
−1 for some λ,µ > 0 (op. cit. eq. (3.7)). A similar
hyperbolic expression, (1 + µt)−β/µ is suggested by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992).
As noted above, for certain λ and µ, the ﬁrst form may correspond to negative welfare
weights - a non-regular welfare representation. In particular, such hyperbolic preferences
express spite against oneself two periods ahead (after each current period) if and only if
(λ + µ)
2 <λ+2µ. In Figure 4 below, which has µ on the horizontal and λ on the vertical
axis, this is the area below the curve.13
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Figure 4: Points below the curve are parameter combinations (µ,λ) for which the welfare
weight f∗(2) is negative.
Clearly, the suﬃcient condition for non-negative welfare weights in proposition 2 is
violated if (λ + µ)
2 <λ+2 µ. However, it also turns out that all welfare weights are non-
negative when the inequality does not hold. Hence, the result in proposition 2 is sharp in
this special case. To see this, let f (0) = 1 and f (t)=( λ + µt)
−1 for all positive t. Then
g(t +1 )≥ g(t) for all t if and only if g (1) ≥ g(0), which is equivalent to (λ + µ)
2 ≥ λ+2µ.
Without any loss of generality, we relabel the parameters in the second form mentioned
above, and study
f(t)=( 1+at)
−b ∀t ∈ N,( 1 8 )
for a,b > 0. It follows from proposition 2 that the corresponding welfare-weight function
f∗ is everywhere positive, since f>0 and the discount factor between successive periods
is strictly increasing over time:
g (t)=
f (t)







.( 1 9 )
We do not have an explicit formula for f∗, though. Instead, using equation (4) we have
generated the welfare weights f∗(t),f o rt =1 ,2,...,50, for diﬀerent combinations of a and
b, and ﬁtted the function
˜ f (t)=
θ
(1 − ˜ a +˜ at)
˜ b (20)
to the data. (Note that ˜ f (1) = θ.)
Table 1 reports the estimates ˜ a, ˜ b and θ, as well as the maximum absolute and relative
errors in the ﬁrst 50 periods. We note that, for ﬁxed a, ˜ a is decreasing and ˜ b increasing in b.
Moreover, ˜ a ≈ 1 and ˜ b ≈ b when a is large. Figure 5 below shows the welfare weights f∗ (t)
(dots) obtained from equation (5), for a =1 0and b =1 , the estimated function-values
12˜ f (t), as well as the ratio ˜ f (t)/f ∗(t).
Table 1: Estimates of f∗ (obtained through Mathematica).
a b θ ˜ a ˜ b max
t≤50
￿ ￿ ￿ ˜ f (t)-f∗(t)
￿ ￿ ￿ max
t≤50
￿ ￿ ￿ ˜ f (t)/f∗(t)-1
￿ ￿ ￿
1 1 0.49999 3.02432 1.28221 0.00079 0.09922
1 2 0.24999 1.74474 1.61539 0.00047 0.44643
1 5 0.03125 0.78373 3.97018 0.00001 4.31526
10 1 0.09091 1.07430 1.14852 0.00003 0.01001
10 2 0.00826 0.95289 1.97737 9.9 · 10−7 0.02664
10 5 6.2 · 10−6 0.90933 4.99927 4.3 · 10−7 0.00149
100 1 0.00990 1.00327 1.01909 1.9 · 10−7 0.00008
100 2 0.00009 0.99069 1.99968 1.7 · 10−10 0.00041
100 5 9.5 · 10−11 0.99009 4.99999 1.1 · 10−22 2.9 · 10−8


















Figure 5: (a) Welfare weights f∗ (t) obtained from equation f (t)=( 1+1 0 t)
−1 (dots) and
the estimated function ˜ f (t) (solid line). (b) The ratio ˜ f (t)/f∗(t).
135 Desiderata for stationary discount functions
Having examined circumstances under which utility functions Uτ in the form (2) have a
regular welfare foundation in the form (3), we now turn to a discussion of some other
desiderata.
Our ﬁrst desideratum is that the representation (2) should be invariant with respect
to periodization, in the sense that there should exist a continuous-time discount function
from which the discrete-time discount factor f(t) in each period t can be derived, for any
given period length ∆ > 0. The Phelps-Pollack-Laibson model (1), to be referred to as the
PPL model, is unclear in this respect, since it states that discounting kicks in from period
1 on, without specifying for what lengths ∆ of the time period this should hold, or, more
generally, how the parameters β and δ should be adjusted if the time period is changed
(c.f. discussion and ﬁgure in section 3). In exponential discounting models one usually
assumes δ =e x p( −r∆) for some real-time discount rate r, but what about β?
Secondly, empirical studies suggests that the considered class of discount functions
should contain some form of hyperbolic discounting as a special case. As mentioned above,
hyperbolic discounting of instantaneous utilities has been shown to ﬁt the data better than
exponential discounting. It therefore seems desirable that the considered class contain such
hyperbolic discounting as a special case. Clearly the quasi-exponential PPL representa-
tion does not meet this second desideratum exactly, only approximately over the ﬁrst few
periods.14
Third, exponential discounting has traditionally been the main approach in economics,
and should therefore be contained in the class. The PPL representation clearly meets this
desideratum (just set β =1in equation (1)).
If a random variable T is exponentially distributed, then its conditional probability
distribution, given T ≥ t, is identical to the original, for any t. It is precisely this time
homogeneity property that guarantees dynamic consistency in intertemporal decision prob-
lems. As a weaker requirement, in the present context of discount functions, our fourth
desideratum is that the class of discount functions considered should be “closed under
truncation” in the sense that the normalized discount factors, from any given future date
on, should belong to the class. When currently contemplating a future decision point, in
a dynamic decision problem, it should not be necessary to step outside the class. The
PPL-representation evidently satisﬁes this desideratum: the decision maker’s preferences
over future periods are exponential.
Finally, the discounting of instantaneous-utilities should have a regular welfare founda-
tion. We saw above that the PPL representation (1) satisﬁes this last desideratum as long
as β ≤ 1.
Formally, we consider preferences over inﬁnite consumption streams x represented in





ϕ(t,∆)u(xτ+t),( 2 1 )
where ϕ(t,∆) is the discount factor that the decision maker in period τ ∈ N assigns to his
or her instantaneous utility in period τ + t, if the length of each period is ∆ > 0.
Let F be any family of functions ϕ : N × R+ → R+ such that ϕ(0,∆) = 1 for all ∆ > 0.
Our desiderata are
D1 (invariance w.r.t. periodization): There exists a function f : R+ → [0,1]
such that ϕ(t,∆) = f (t∆) for all t ∈ N and ∆ > 0.
D2(hyperbolic discounting allowed): Every function ϕ of the form ϕ(t,∆) =
(1+αt∆)
−β, for some α,β > 0 ,belongs to F.
D3(exponential discounting allowed): Every function ϕ of the form ϕ(t,∆) =
exp(−γt∆) for some γ>0,belongs to F.
D4(algebraic closure under truncation): If ϕ ∈ F,then also ϕτ ∈ F for any





D5 (regular welfare foundation): If ϕ ∈ F, and f : N →[0,1] is deﬁned by
f (t)=ϕ(t,1) for all t,then the associated welfare weights f∗(t) are all non-
negative.
6 Hyperbolic-exponential discount functions
One family F which meets all desiderata are the functions ϕ of the form
ϕ(t,∆) = (1 + at∆)
−b e−ct∆ (22)
for some a,b,c > 0. This family F is three-dimensional, the minimal parametric dimen-
sionality for the PPL model to hold across diﬀerent time discretization. Hence, we have
not added any real degree of freedom above and beyond that of the PPL model.
It is not diﬃcult to see that all ﬁve desiderata indeed hold. Desideratum 1 is given by
construction. Also desiderata 2 and 3 are self-evident; one obtains exponential discounting
by setting b =0 , and hyperbolic discounting by setting c =0 . That desideratum 4 holds
follows from
ϕτ (t,∆ )=( 1+a
￿t∆)
−be
−ct∆,( 2 3 )
15where a￿ = a/(1 + ∆τa) > 0. In other words, ϕτ ∈ F. Note that the parameters b and
c are unaﬀected by such truncation of the past, while the parameter a changes. Dynamic
inconsistency arises from the single fact that this parameter decreases with the number τ
of past periods, for any ﬁxed period length ∆. To ﬁnally see that desideratum 5 holds,
note that:
f (t)=βtδ
t for all t ∈ N,( 2 4 )
where βt =( 1+at)
−b and δ = e−c. Since the discount factor g (t)=δβt/βt−1 between
successive periods accordingly is strictly increasing, all welfare weights f∗(t) are positive
by proposition 2.
This family of discount functions is closely related to the PPL model. We here have
β0 =1 , and g(t)=δβt+1/βt → δ as t →∞ , just as in the PPL model.
As a ﬁnal remark, we note that the present family of discount functions seems to be
suﬃciently rich to ﬁt a wide range of empirical observations. Frederick, Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue (2001) report empirical estimates of discount rates from no less than 40 studies
(Table 2, op. cit.) Their general ﬁnding is that the average discount rate over longer time
intervals is lower than the average discount rate over shorter time intervals. Figure 6 below
is their Figure 1, with the addition of the dotted curve. The points are their data points,
and the solid curve has been ﬁtted by them, while the dotted curve has been ﬁtted by us,
from a discount function from the present family F.15 This ﬁtting was made by way of
“eye econometrics,” resulting in the following estimates: a =1 0 , b =0 .3 and c =0 .16
Figure 6: Fitting a discount function f (dotted curve) from the family F to the data in
Figure 1 of Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2001).
Figures 7 and 8 compare the instantaneous-utility weights f(t) and the welfare weights
15T h ed o t t e dc u r vei st h eg r a p ho f y (t)=[ f (t)]
1/t =( 1+at)
−b/t e−c,f o ra =1 0 , b =0 .3 and c =0 .
Note that limt→0 y(t)=e x p[ −(ab +c)] and limt→+∞ y(t)=e x p( −c).
16Hence, according to this rough estimate, there is no need for an exponential factor - hyperbolic dis-
counting is suﬃcient. Needless to say, however, more careful empirical studies are needed for any general
conclusion of this sort.
16f∗(t) corresponding to our estimate, f(t)=( 1+1 0 t)−0.3 (grey bars), with the Laibson et al
(2001) estimate (black bars in ﬁgure 7) and with exponential discounting with an annual
discount rate of 5% (black bars in ﬁgure 8). The latter is the macro-based estimate of
Cooley and Prescott (1995).17
















Figure 7: (a) f(t)=( 1 + 1 0 t)−0.3 (gray) and quasi-exponential instantaneous-utility weights
(β,δ), for β =0 .55 and δ =0 .96 (black). (b) The corresponding welfare weights f∗(t).
















Figure 8: (a) f(t)=(1+1 0t)−0.3 (gray) and f(t)=e−0.05t (black). (b) The corresponding
welfare weights f∗(t).
7C o n c l u s i o n
We started out by asking if discounting of future instantaneous utilities is consistent with
altruism towards future selves, within a stationary and additively separable modelling
framework. We identiﬁed a recursive functional equation which relates welfare weights - the
altruistic weight attached to the total utility of future selves - to the weights given to future
17To be more precise, they give the estimate 0.987 of the quarterly discount factor.
17instantaneous utilities. If the welfare weights are non-negative, so are the instantaneous-
utility weights. However, the converse is not true in general. Indeed, we saw that certain
discounting schemes in the literature are inconsistent with altruism towards one’s future
selves or towards future generations. We also established a suﬃcient condition for consis-
tency in this respect, namely that the discount factor attached to instantaneous utilities
between successive periods should not decrease over time. In other words, the discount rate
should be non-increasing. (Recall that this rate is constant under exponential discount-
ing.) The quasi-exponential discounting models which are currently under investigation
in the macroeconomics literature (see for example. Laibson (1997), Barro (1999), Krusell
and Smith (1999), Laibson and Harris (2001) and Angeletos et al (2001)) all have this
property, as do some of the hyperbolic discounting models in the psychology literature (see
for example Herrnstein (1981), Mazur (1987) and Ainslie (1992)). Indeed, the property
of a decreasing discount rate seems to conform with all available empirical data, both for
humans and animals.
Moreover, estimates of the parameter β in the Phelps-Pollak-Laibson (1) model suggest
β-values near 0.5 (Angeletos et al, 2001). In our theoretical investigation, we found that β =
0.5 corresponds to exponentially declining weights given to future selves (or generations).
Is this a mere coincidence or is there some more profound reason to expect β-values to be
near 0.5? Perhaps this question should not be taken too seriously, however, since empirical
estimates presumably depend in part on the periodization of the time-series data. An
interesting question thus is what β-estimates one obtains for diﬀerent period lengths. Such
a study could also shed light on one of the ﬁve desiderata that we postulate at the end of
the study: the discount function for instantaneous utilities should be consistent with some
continuous-time discount function.18 More generally, we hope the present theoretical study
can be of some help when discriminating between diﬀerent functional forms in subsequent
empirical work on time preferences.
An important question that this study leaves open is the mathematical tractability
of the proposed hyperbolic-exponential discounting functions when used in dynamic op-
timization. Laibson and Harris (2001) were able to generalize the Euler equations from
exponential to quasi-exponential discounting, which was not an easy task. It seems that
the step from exponential to hyperbolic-exponential discounting is even bigger and may
lead to involved ﬁrst-order conditions.
From the viewpoint of experimental studies of intertemporal preferences, ﬁnally, all
the discounting models discussed here seem quite restrictive. See, for example, Freder-
ick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2001) and Kahneman (2000), and see also Rubinstein
(2001) for a critical discussion of discounting models. Hence, generalizations in behaviorally
relevant directions are called for.
18The same requirement for the welfare weights does not seem to make sense, since in the limit as the
period shrinks to zero, each self has zero life span.
188A p p e n d i x
8.1 Proof of proposition 1
Suppose ￿Uτ￿ satisﬁes equation (2) for some u : X → R and f : N → R with f (0) = 1.




































Since this holds for all τ, this proves the claim.
8.2 Proof of proposition 2
Suppose ﬁrst that g is non-decreasing. We know that f∗ (1) = f (1) > 0. Suppose f∗(s) ≥
0 ∀s<t . Then
f
∗(t)=f(t) − f(1)f





= g(t)f(t − 1) − f(1)f∗(t − 1) −
t−2 ￿
s=1
g(t − s)f∗(s)f(t − s − 1)
≥ g(t)
￿
f(t − 1) −
t−2 ￿
s=1
f∗(s)f(t − s − 1)
￿
− f(1)f∗(t − 1)
= g(t)f∗(t − 1) − f(1)f∗(t − 1) = [g(t) − f(1)]f∗(t − 1) ≥ 0.
The last inequality follows from the assumption that g is non-decreasing and f(1) = g(1).
Secondly, suppose that g is strictly increasing. Suppose f∗(s) > 0 ∀s ≤ t. The same
reasoning as above then leads to f∗(t) > [g(t) − g(1)]f∗(t − 1) > 0.
198.3 Proof of equation (8)
Suppose f(s)=2 s−1αs for s =1 ,2,..,t, for some positive integer t. Then (5) gives

















1+( 2 t − 1)
￿
=2 tαt+1.
By induction in t, this establishes (8).
8.4 Proof of equation (15)
Equation (15) may be established by induction over t, as follows. First note that f(1) =



































1 − (1 − β)t−1￿
= βδ
t
8.5 Proof of equation (10)













Setting f∗(s)=αs for all positive integers s ≤ T and otherwise f∗(s)=0 , we obtain (5).
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